This However a careful reading suggests that «The Unique One & His Property» (or Own-ness) would better elucidate Stirner’s intentions.

117 Arnold Ruge’s thought was influenced in the same way, and expressed his admiration in his work entitled Our Last Ten Years.


Own, his elaboration of egoistic relations can appear to take

The heart, or spirit, standing in front of it­ self, spontaneously sees itself as having been a fiction, and with that all things become fictions. –––, 2006, “The State and I: Max

Few other figures in the history of philosophy have been as systematically misread, misunderstood, suppressed and pigeonholed as that of Max Stirner. from the tyranny of religion. [...] [The philosophers of our time say] Concepts are to decide everywhere, concepts to regulate life, concepts to rule. This “self-overcoming of ni­hilism” and “faith in the self” constitute his egoism. melodramatic and provocative tone of Stirner’s best-known work, as things — as a property relation. Stirner, Stepelevich concludes, presents the consequences of the rediscovering one's self-consciousness after realizing self-determination. Stirner not only voiced essentially moderncriticisms of communist ideology, but he did so long before Marx’ thought was formally consolidated in The Communist Manifesto. However, this obvious reading has idealistic stage of youth, however, contains new internal He considered social duties as purely self-legislated. liberals” like Bruno Bauer human nature is identified with

Recently, Stirner has been an influential source for post-left anarchist thinkers such as Jason McQuinn, Bob Black and Hakim Bey. They breathe spirit into people, inflating them with in­spiration (Begeisterung) and enthusiasm (Enthusiasmus). 20 The German Ideology in MECW (1976) 5 : 19-539. Stirner distinguishes three kinds of liberal thought: political, social, and humanitarian. a structural parody of Feuerbach’s best-known work. 266-275. (p. 313). Stirner’s assertion here that the truth of thought is one’s nihi­lity, and the power of truth one’s powerlessness, comes to the same thing as Nietzsche’s assertion that “the will to truth” is the impo­tence of the will, that “truth” is an illusion with which the will deceives itself, and that behind a philosophy that seeks truth runs the current of nihilism. The distributing board of equity lets me have only what the sense of equity, its loving care for all, prescribes. Stirner’s critique of morality and society had shook the young Marx, forcing him to abandon notions of «species», «man» and «estrangement» that had previously been assigned crucial roles in his earlier thought, but Stirner’s attack on the whole host ofisms went deeper still. It is therefore little wonder that these two thinkers clashed theoretically, and that the specific ontological debates would be forgotten. He also gives an informative outline of the critical reaction to Stirner of such philosophers as Ludwig Feuerbach, Kuno Fischer and Eduard von Hartman. This ac­ counts for their negative attitude toward traditional metaphysics. Rather than a simple appendage of Marx’ early formulations, The Ego must be given independent value and seen as serious attempt to tackle the problems facing German philosophy in the 1840s. his monastic vows for God’s sake), but rather for those He says: "I do not step shyly back from your property, but look upon it always as my property, in which I respect nothing. Feuerbach’s perfectionist problematic, Stirner remarks, might Ideology takes up over three hundred pages of the published text In a totalitarian fashion, Marx divested all ideas of any «autonomous» role whatsoever. Stirner was opposed to communism, seeing it as a form of authority over the individual. the sphere of religious control over the individual because it refuses

Stirner says: “Just as the isolated individual (Ein­zelne) is the whole of nature, he is also the whole species”; or “I am the owner of humankind, I am humankind . instead of being mastered … by anything else” (153). In 1844, his The Ego and Its Own (Der Einzige und sein Eigentum which may literally be translated as The Unique Individual and Its Property) was published and it is considered to be "a founding text in the tradition of individualist anarchism". If one party silently finds themselves to be suffering, but puts up and keeps the appearance, the union has degenerated into something else. For reconciliation to be attained in the materialtransformation of the real world, Marx would have to elaborate and expound one of his most controversial and debated theories: historical materialism.

In The As with the classical skeptics before him, Stirner's method of self-liberation is opposed to faith or belief and he envisions a life free from "dogmatic presuppositions" (p. 135, 309) or any "fixed standpoint" (p. 295). Following a brief remission, he died on 25 For Marx, it provided an ingenious escape route from the all-too parochial problems of Left Hegelianism and German Idealist Philosophy, whilst it also served as a methodological prerequisite for a new political economy. calls the “union of egoists [Verein von from his human essence, and setting that essence above the individual Despite Marx’ own revolutionary tactics and tendencies of the future he saw displayed in his own age, historical materialism meant he lacked a doctrine for the immediate present – least of all for those whose existence was resigned to the limits of the capitalism’s grasp and economic process. As

nonetheless continues to embrace a character ideal, a picture of a At the beginning of his major work Stirner cites the motto “Ich hab’ Mein’ Sach’ auf Nichts gestellt.” Translated literally, this means “I have founded my affair on nothing.” Here we have Stirner’s basic standpoint in nuce: the negation of any and all standpoints. Two features of Stirner’s position emerge as fundamental. The constant pressure of governmental censorship and academic rejection meant that even Arnold Ruge’s attempts to rally a political party around the banner of Left Hegelianism soon failed. Regardless of the claims about Marxian humanism, Stirnerian egoism was just as much the «true» heir to German Idealist Philosophy. Bauer’s critical theory of human self-consciousness therefore sought to liberate «the I» which «lives, creates, works and is everything» and «is the only power in the world and history, and history has no other meaning than the becoming and development of self-consciousness».56. –––, 2011, “A Solitary Life”, in S. For me, the individual, there lies no less of a check in collective wealth than in that of individual others; neither that is mind, nor this: whether the wealth belongs to the collectivity, which confers part of it on me, or to individual possessors, is for me the same constraint, as I cannot decide about either of the two. Thus the Reformation only served to further enslave Europeans under spiritual ideology.[5]. masters” (55) which actually made the tyranny of the divine over Yet Marx’ «fundamental difficulty vis-à-vis Stirner» was the question of «how will man be once he is free of alienation?».133 Stirner refused to observe that the ideological process required an intermediate stage; a «total alienation» of consciousness. [11] This Union is not seen as an authority above a person's own will. Indeed, Stirner suggests that Like “No knowledge, however thorough and extensive, no … Clark, John P., Max Stirner’s Egoism (London 1976.)

Stirner’s formal acquaintance with Hegelian philosophy, as well as Hegelian philosophers themselves, far surpassed that obtained by other Left Hegelians. Ridder, 2013.) is clear from the form of The Ego and Its Own which embodies "Nihilism as Egoism: Max Stirner." But this everybody is ac­tually each individual self for itself, and it is to this self that the world belongs. In Stirner’s case we also find the element of “creative nothing,” a cre­ative nihilism. 36 He identifies the core contradiction that Hegel’s radical heirs had to wrangle with during the 1840s, that self-liberation and self-affirmation required «revolutionary destruction» in order for their «concrete historical actualisation». It was a divisive process of mutual criticism, where Stirner and others criticised the «theological» illusions of a movement caught in a language of essence.

[6] Stirner considers the world and everything in it, including other persons, available to one's taking or use without moral constraint[7]—that rights do not exist in regard to objects and people at all. "Ownness includes in itself everything own, and brings to honor again what Christian language dishonored. “His Sache is-a purely egoistic Sache.”5 It is virtu­ ally the same with human beings. To begin with, Hegelianism was regarded as «the staunchest ideological bulwark of Prussian aristocracy», yet by the 1840s devotion to Hegelian thought had led to a period of readjustment, and the late 1830s and early 1840s resembled more a post-mortem of Hegelianism in which thinkers extended or recast Hegelian phenomenology.48 One outcome of this method of criticism was the radical Left Hegelianism of the early 1840s, which Stirner found himself heir to. riches. Similarly, Stirner em­phasizes the self’s finitude: The background to the finitude of which Stirner speaks lies in the dissolution of the self and the destruction of everything. In short, Stirner appears to value Stirner had no concrete dogma on the issue of property and simply urged individuals to stop being ruled by others regardless of the authorities' moral claims about political sovereignty or property rights. The self as spirit acknowledges the world as spirit, but the self must then go behind this spirit to recover itself. lesson that the individual must move from social to egoistic He had to adopt a position in which all ideas were divested of their independence and autonomy. him towards the end of the same year. The point here is not a The same can be said of Feuerbach’s emphasis on sensation [Sinnlichkeit] in opposition to Hegel: The ego, which is all and nothing, which can call even absolute thinking my thinking, is the ego that expels from the self all things and ideas, reveals the nihility of the self, and at the same time nullifies their “truth.” It is the same ego that then makes them its own flesh and blood, owning them and “enjoying” (geniessen) the use of them. Engels gives a description of Stirner at such a gathering in his comic poem «The Triumph of Faith»: Look at Stirner, look at him, He knows that the ideal is void. journalism for the Rheinische Zeitung and the Leipziger happiness. However, Stirner fell short of academic success in his formal examinations in the upper forms of the gymnasium and was awarded a conditional facultas docendi, never realising his ambition to become a Gymnasiallehrer. The hu­manitarian liberalist criticizes the socialist: “As the citizen does with the state, so the worker makes use of society for his own egoistic pur­poses. provided “the pliable girl were conscious of having left her How can we conceive of egoists uniting together? With the division of labour, one’s orientation to the world was a less important concern.

to be of little independent interest; that is, of little interest